Abstract: The public provision of long-term care (LTC) can replace family-provided LTC when adults are not sufficiently altruistic towards their parents. But State intervention can modify the transmission of values and reduce the longrun prevalence of family altruism. To characterize the optimal LTC policy, we develop a three-period OLG model where the adult population is divided into altruistic and non-altruistic agents, and where the transmission of altruism follows a socialization process`a la Bisin and Verdier (2001, The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences. Journal of Economic Theory 97:298-319). It is shown that public LTC benefits, by reducing parental investment in children, make the long-run survival of family altruism less likely. However, whether crowding out arises or not depends on individual preferences and on the socialization mechanism at work. We also study the incompatibility of the optimal short-run LTC benefits with long-run social welfare maximization. Finally, we discuss the robustness of our results to introducing savings and universal LTC benefits.
Introduction
The provision of long-term care (LTC) constitutes a major challenge for advanced economies. As a consequence of the ageing process, an increasingly large number of persons reports having some type of functional limitation (e.g. sensory, physical or mental limitations), which prevent them from being autonomous. The European Union (2009) forecasts that the number of elderly dependents in the EU-27 will grow from about 21 million people in 2007 to more than 44 million people in 2060. Such a substantial rise in the number of elderly dependents will stimulate the aggregate demand for LTC services.
Whether the demand for LTC services is satisfied by informal care (provided by family or friends) or by formal care (either at home or in nursing homes), helping the dependent elderly is extremely costly.
1 This explains why the funding of LTC services has become a major research area. A large number of articles have recently focused on what is called the "LTC insurance puzzle".
2 That puzzle can be stated as follows: although the probabilities to become dependent are large, and although LTC is costly, individuals do not, in general, purchase private insurance against LTC. 3 Various explanations have been provided, such as excessive loading factors (Cutler 1993; Brown and Finkelstein 2004a) , crowding out of private insurance by social insurance (Sloan and Norton 1997; Norton 2000; Brown and Finkelstein 2004b) and reliance on family altruism (Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan 1996; Sloan, Picone, and Hoeger 1997) . 4 A related issue concerns the design of the optimal public intervention in the context of old-age dependency. In a pioneer paper, Jousten et al. (2005) studied the optimal LTC policy in an economy where households are composed of one dependent parent and one child under heterogeneity on the degree of altruism of children towards their parents. They found that, under asymmetric information about the altruism of children, the optimal policy consists of providing low quality of institutional care to the elderly in need, to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint. More recently, Pestieau and Sato (2008) examined the optimal tax policy in an economy where a fraction of the elderly becomes dependent, and where young adults differ in their productivity at work.
Although those articles cast an original light on the optimal LTC policy under heterogeneous agents, those static frameworks cannot account for another key aspect of the problem: the impact of public intervention on the family's private provision of LTC through its influence on the transmission of family values. Suppose that we are in an economy where the government commits itself to helping elderly parents in need as a result of non-altruistic children. Is it then the case that family altruism will, in the long-run, survive in the population? Or will the State's intervention crowd out family altruism, by influencing the society's transmission of values? What kind of restrictions does the intergenerational transmission of values impose on the optimal LTC provision?
These questions can only be answered in a dynamic framework, where the partition of the population in terms of altruistic and non-altruistic agents is a variable evolving over time as the output of a socialization process. The goal of this article is to examine, within such a framework, the conditions under which the provision of LTC benefits by the State crowds out the provision of LTC by families through its effects on the intergenerational transmission of values.
For that purpose, we develop a three-period overlapping generations model (OLG) where the adult population is divided into altruistic and non-altruistic agents, who differ regarding whether they care about their dependent parents or not. The transmission of (non) altruism follows a socialization process à la Bisin and Verdier (2001) . Parents can influence the probability that their child is altruistic thanks to socialization efforts. 5 Socialization is costly but brings benefits at the old age: the parent of an altruistic child will, once dependent, receive the help of his child. 6 The incentive to socialize the child depends on what the elderly receives when his child is not altruistic. This is where the State's provision of LTC benefits to the dependent in need can affect the socialization process and the long-run composition of the population. We propose to identify, within that framework, formal conditions under which such an intervention crowds out family aid, by making family altruism disappear in the long-run. Anticipating on our results, we first study the dynamics of heterogeneity at the laissez-faire and identify the determinants of the survival or disappearance of family altruism, under alternative assumptions regarding the transmission mechanisms of traits. Then, we introduce LTC benefits towards the parents of non-altruistic children and show that whether crowding out arises or not depends on individual preferences, on the socialization mechanism and on the initial prevalence of altruism. In a third stage, we characterize the optimal shortrun public intervention (i.e. for a fixed partition of the population into altruistic and non-altruistic agents) and show that it is, under general conditions, incompatible with long-run social welfare maximization, so that evolutionary forces impose some upper bound on LTC benefits. Our results are shown to be globally 5 Our article differs from Canta and Pestieau (2012) , who focus on a dynamic economy composed of traditional and opportunistic agents under exogenous transition probabilities. 6 In that framework, individuals can neither save resources for their old days nor purchase private LTC insurance. The reason why we make those assumptions lies in individual misperception of LTC risks in the real world (Finkelstein and McGarry 2003) and in the underdevelopment of private LTC insurance markets. Those facts motivate us to develop a baseline model that focuses on a provision of LTC either by the family or by the State. The possibility of selfinsurance through private savings is discussed in Section 6.1 below. robust to introducing private savings and universal LTC benefits, in particular regarding the possibility of crowding out of family altruism by public policy.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies population dynamics at the laissez-faire. Section 4 examines the impact of LTC benefits on dynamics. Section 5 compares short-run and long-run social optima (and their decentralization). Section 6 studies the robustness of our results to introducing savings and universal LTC benefits. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Environment
Let us consider a three-period OLG economy. Each cohort is a continuum of agents whose length is normalized to unity. First period is childhood, during which the child does not work, does not consume and does not take any decision. Second period is young adulthood, during which agents work, consume and make one child. All young adult agents earn an income y > 0 during that period. Third period is the old age; elderly persons are retired and dependent.
7 Thus every young adult has an elderly dependent parent. We assume also, like Jousten et al. (2005) , that there is no private saving for dependency.
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During childhood, all individuals are assumed to be identical. However, there exist two types of adult agents: altruistic agents (i.e. type a) care about their parents, while non-altruistic parents (i.e. type n) do not care about their parents. 9 We denote by q t the fraction of altruistic adults within the young adult cohort at time t. The difference between agents of types a and n lies in the fact that type-a agents derive, when being young, some welfare from the resources consumed by their parents, unlike type-n agents. Following Jousten et al. (2005) that difference can be modelled by assuming that the utility from consumption for a young adult agent of type i 2 fa; ng takes the form:
where c i denotes the young adult's own consumption when being young, d i is the consumption of his parent, while uðÁÞ and vðÁÞ are temporal utility functions for the young adult and the elderly adult. 10 We assume that those state-dependent utility functions satisfy standard properties: u 0 ðÁÞ > 0, u 00 ðÁÞ < 0, v 0 ðÁÞ > 0 and v 00 ðÁÞ < 0. Moreover, to do justice to the harshness, in welfare terms, of the dependency state, we assume that the old-age temporal utility function is (weakly) less reactive than the young-age temporal utility function:
The parameter β i accounts for the altruism of children towards their elderly parent. Agents of types a and n differ as to the level of β
Socialization
The population follows an adaptation and imitation process of the type modelled by Bisin and Verdier (2001) . The transmission of the parameter β i reflecting children's altruism towards their old dependent parents is modelled as a mechanism where socialization inside the family and socialization outside the family interact. The first type of socialization is called the vertical transmission (from parents to children), while the second type is called the oblique transmission (from a "role model" in the society to the child). Families are composed of one parent and one child. Children are born at time t without any cultural trait i 2 a; n f g. Direct vertical socialization to the parent's trait i 2 a; n f g occurs with a probability ρ i tþ1 . If the direct vertical socialization does not take place, which happens with a probability 1 À ρ i tþ1 , the child then picks up the trait of a model chosen randomly in the population of reference, which is the population of young adults. Thus, the child will take the trait a with a probability q t , and the trait n with a probability 1 À q t .
Denoting by p ij tþ1 the probability that a child born at time t in a family with trait i 2 a; n f g is socialized to trait j 2 a; n f g, transition probabilities are:
10 Assuming a single input in the production of old-age welfare leads us to abstract here from the choice between formal and informal aid. However, given that our focus is on crowding out by the State that simplification is benign. 11 Fixing β i to either 0 or 1 is an obvious simplification, but which has only minor effects on our results. We will discuss later on the influence of that assumption on our findings.
Long-Term Care, Altruism and Socialization
By the Law of Large Numbers, p ij tþ1 is also equal to the proportion of children whose parents are of type i who have the cultural trait j. Hence, the proportion q tþ1 of agents born at time t who become of type a follows the dynamic law:
The first term is the probability to be socialized to trait a when having a family of type a, multiplied by the probability to belong to a family of type a. The second term is the probability to acquire trait a when being born in a family of type n, multiplied by the probability to belong to a family of type n. 
where δ accounts for the disutility of socialization efforts (δ > 0). We assume that all parents would like their children to be altruistic towards them, in order to benefit from their children's help.
14 This egoistic motivation invites a refinement of the standard Bisin-Verdier (2001) set up, which relies on parental imperfect altruism, parents wanting their children to be like them. While altruistic parents make efforts to convince their children to be like them (as in Bisin-Verdier),
12 Assuming a physical effort -rather than an effort in terms of time or goods -is a simplification, which is common to the literature on cultural transmission (see Bisin and Verdier 2010) . That assumption ensures that there are no income effects on socialization (see infra).
13 For simplicity, we assume here that socialization costs are symmetric across types. As discussed in Ponthiere (2011) , introducing asymmetric socialization costs can affect long-run population dynamics. However, in our context where all parents want to transmit the same trait, it is not obvious to see why some type of parents would face smaller socialization costs. 14 As such, we depart from Olivera (2011). non-altruistic parents make efforts to convince their children not to be like them.
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Regarding how parental efforts affect the probabilities of direct transmissions of traits, there exist various possible transmission technologies. We will first consider a transmission technology called "It's the family" by Bisin and Verdier (2001) . Under that technology, the probability of direct vertical socialization is independent from the composition of the population. We assume that, for a child in a family of type a, the probability of direct vertical socialization is:
The probability of direct vertical socialization for a child in a family of type n is equal to 1 minus the parental effort:
The intuition is that egoistic parents, by their efforts, reduce the probability that their children are egoistic like them.
Alternatively, we assume that the probability of direct vertical socialization for a child depends on the parental socialization effort, as well as on the current composition of the population. This consists of what Bisin and Verdier (2001) call the "It takes a village" technology. The probability of direct vertical socialization for a child in a family of type a is equal to the socialization effort of the parent multiplied by the fraction of the population that is altruistic 16 :
Regarding the probability of direct vertical socialization for a child in a family of type n, this is assumed to be equal to 1 minus the socialization effort of the parent, multiplied by the proportion of parents with the altruistic trait:
15 Such efforts are widespread in real life and often take the form of family stories or justifications, which are used by parents to convince their children not to behave like them. Adults who abandon their parents can try to justify that attitude by giving to their own children some reasons why they are right to do so in their particular case, even though abandoning elderly parents is not good in general.
16 The probability of direct vertical socialization depends here on the true proportion of young adults who help their elderly parents and not on some beliefs about that proportion. That assumption has important consequences. Clearly, if beliefs affected socialization efforts, then the overall dynamics might be modified, with a larger occurrence of multiple equilibria. Moreover, relaxing the perfect observability assumption could affect the design of the optimal policy. Section 6.2, which considers universal LTC benefits, partly relaxes the perfect observability assumption, by assuming that the government cannot identify elderly persons with non-altruistic children (see infra). 
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Regarding the socialization effort, we have, under "It's the family" 20 :
17 On demonstration effects, see Canta and Pestieau (2012) . 18 See Section 7 for a discussion on various possible extensions.
19 As u 0 ðxÞ ! v 0 ðxÞ "x ! 0, the share θ lies between 0 and 1=2.
20 Throughout this article, we assume the interiority of optimal socialization efforts, with 0 e i t 1. This imposes some (weak) restrictions on vðÁÞ and on the parameter δ. For instance, in the case of "It's the family", interiority conditions are 0 q t vðd a tþ1 ÞÀvðd n tþ1 Þ δ 1 and
Thus the socialization effort is decreasing in the cost parameter δ and increasing in the gains from having an altruistic child, equal to vðd a tþ1 Þ À vðd n tþ1 Þ. The effort is decreasing in the proportion of the population being altruistic. That property is known as the "cultural substitution property" (see Bisin and Verdier 2001) .
Note also that the optimal socialization effort depends strongly on the slope of the old-age temporal utility function vðÁÞ. If vðÁÞ has a very low slope and is almost flat, then the parental gain from having altruistic children is very small, and hence, the optimal socialization effort is also very low. If, on the contrary, vðÁÞ has a sufficiently large slope, there is a much bigger gain from having altruistic children, and so parents choose a higher socialization effort.
The problem faced by a non-altruistic child can be written as:
First-order conditions for consumption and aid to the parent yield:
Thus non-altruistic children consume their entire income and do not give any help to their dependent parent.
Regarding socialization efforts, we have, under "It's the family":
e n t differs from e a t , since e n t is increasing in the proportion of altruistic parents in the population q t . The reason is that, by socializing their children, non-altruistic parents reduce the probability of direct vertical socialization to their (egoistic) trait. That strategy makes sense only if the society includes a large number of altruistic role models.
21
Consider now the "It takes a village" transmission. We have 22 :
21 Otherwise, it is better not to socialize children and to let them take their egoistic trait in a costless way. 
Here again, the socialization effort chosen by the parents depends on the shape of the old-age temporal utility function. But given that q t < 1, a parent invests more, ceteris paribus, in socialization under "It's the family" than under "It takes a village", since the return on socialization is always lower under the latter technology. Hence, the particular socialization mechanism at work is not neutral as far as the parental socialization decision is concerned. The dependency of the socialization effort is observed both for altruistic and for non-altruistic parents.
Proposition 1 Consider the laissez-faire economy.
-Under the "It's the family" technology, we have:
vðθyÞ À vð0Þ δ -Under the "It takes a village" technology, we have:
Proof. See the above FOCs. ■ At the temporary equilibrium under the laissez-faire, there exists a large inequality between the resources enjoyed by elderly individuals, depending on whether their children are altruistic or not. Parents of altruistic children benefit from a positive amount of resources given to them by their children, while parents of non-altruistic children are left with no resource at all, which is most problematic in front of LTC needs. Similar inequalities -but in the reverse direction -occur at the young age, where non-altruistic young adults benefit from higher consumptions than altruistic young adults. As a consequence, the proportion q t of altruistic adults in the population is a major determinant of the aggregate distribution of consumption at the different ages of life.
Long-run population dynamics
Let us now examine the dynamics of population. The proportion of altruistic adults in a cohort follows the dynamic law:
Consider first the "It's the family" transmission. Substituting for probabilities of vertical socialization, we obtain:
From which we have:
That expression states that the variation of the proportion of agents with type a is increasing in the gap between the probabilities of direct vertical socialization for type a and type n. A major difference with respect to the standard BisinVerdier setting is that, as all parents would like their children to be altruistic towards them, the rise in q t is increasing in the sum of all parents' efforts: altruistic (e a t ) and non-altruistic (e n t ). This differs from standard models, where it is increasing in the difference between parents' efforts.
Given that e a t ¼ ð1 À q t Þ Δ δ and that e n t ¼ q t Δ δ , where vðθyÞ À vð0Þ ½ is denoted by Δ, the dynamic equation can be rewritten as:
The existence, uniqueness and stability of a stationary equilibrium can be studied by analyzing the properties of the transition function Fðq t Þ ; q
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the long-run dynamics of q t under the "It's the family" transmission technology: -If vðθyÞÀvð0Þ δ < 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q ¼ 0 and q ¼ 1. Only q ¼ 0 is locally stable.
-If vðθyÞÀvð0Þ δ ¼ 1, there exists a continuum 0; 1 ½ of stationary equilibria, which are all unstable.
-If vðθyÞÀvð0Þ δ > 1, there exist only two stationary equilibria, q ¼ 0 and q ¼ 1.
Only q ¼ 1 is locally stable.
Proof. See the Appendix. ■
Long-Term Care, Altruism and Socialization
The dynamics of the population can take three forms. If the welfare gain from having altruistic children is low (i.e. the old-age temporal utility function is very flat), any population including initially some non-altruistic individuals will turn out to be fully non-altruistic in the long-run, because socialization efforts are too low to sustain an altruistic population. That case is illustrated on Figure 1 below. On the contrary, if the welfare gain from altruistic children is large (i.e. the old-age temporal utility function is steep), the long-run population will only include altruistic individuals, since the socialization efforts are high in that case (see Under the "It takes a village" technology, q t follows the law: Proof. See the Appendix. ■ Under a low welfare gain from having altruistic children, the population dynamics is close to the one under "It's the family": altruism towards dependent parents will disappear in the long-run (see Figure 3 ). However, when there is a large welfare gain from altruistic children, there exist now three -instead of two -stationary equilibria (see Figure 4 ). The intermediate equilibrium is unstable and acts as a threshold below which altruism will disappear and beyond which altruism will be universal in the long-run. That threshold did not exist in the "It's the family" case, where, under vðθyÞÀvð0Þ δ > 1, the population would be fully altruistic in the long-run for any q 0 > 0. This is not true under "It takes a village", where the generalization of altruism requires
In sum, the proportion of the dependent who are helped by their children is likely to vary over time, in a direction that depends on how large the welfare gain from having altruistic children is in comparison to the welfare cost from socialization. In the long-run, altruism towards the dependent can either disappear or become general, depending on the relative welfare gains from altruistic children. That result is robust to the specification of the transmission technology, even though the "It takes a village" technology involves an unstable intermediate stationary equilibrium that makes initial conditions relevant, unlike under the "It's the family" technology.
Finally, it should be stressed that the model presented here can be parameterized in various ways, so as to explain the observed dynamics of heterogeneity in various countries. Suppose, for instance, that one observes that the proportion of young individuals who help their dependent parents has declined in some country (despite the absence of public policy). Such a decline can correspond either to an economy with low vðθyÞ À vð0Þ and/or high δ or to an economy with the "It takes a village", with an initial level of q t strictly inferior to the intermediate equilibrium. One could also use Figure 4 to explain why some other economy, which is very similar in many aspects to the previous one, except that it has a slightly larger initial proportion of altruistic persons, will not exhibit such a decline of altruism. Thus, the present theoretical framework can be used to explain various patterns, even when the State does not intervene.
An economy with LTC policy
Let us now introduce a government, which can observe whether individuals are altruistic or not, and helps the dependent elderly who are not helped by their children (and not the others). For that purpose, the government taxes non-altruistic young adults in a non-distortionary way and provides LTC benefits to their elderly parents in need. 23 The government runs a balanced budget. Hence, denoting by g, the resources spent by the government on each elderly dependent person in need and by τ the lump sum tax on non-altruistic children, we have:
Following Jousten et al. (2005), we assume that the government's productivity in the provision of LTC services is less good than the one of children. Hence, each dependent elderly parent with non-altruistic children receives an effective aid equal to a fraction μ of the LTC benefit g, where 0 < μ < 1. 
Temporary equilibrium
As a consequence of public intervention, we now have, under the "It's the family" technology, the following socialization efforts:
The welfare gain from having an altruistic child is now lower than under the laissez-faire, since the government, by providing μg to the dependent in case of non-altruistic children, reduces the loss due to having non-altruistic children.
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Consider now the "It takes a village" technology. We have: 
Here again, the socialization efforts chosen by parents are now lower, ceteris paribus, in comparison to the laissez-faire. The State aid, by raising the elderly's 23 We do not consider here whether such a LTC policy would emerge from voting. But there are strong reasons to believe that it would: parents of non-altruistic children are in favour, as well as young altruistic children (since it would reduce their socialization efforts). Parents of altruistic children are indifferent, and only non-altruistic children are likely to be against. Hence, assuming that q tÀ1 ' q t , the proposal of a LTC policy would obtain the majority of votes. On voting on LTC in a more general environment with unequal wages and dependence risk, see De Donder and Pestieau (2011) . 24 In the rest of this article, we focus on the case where μg < θy, to rule out corner solutions. That restriction is not problematic since the optimal policy always satisfies that condition. 25 Note that the interior conditions for 0 e i t 1 are necessarily weaker here than at the laissez-faire. Hence we will not pay too much attention to these in this section.
Long-Term Care, Altruism and Socialization welfare in case of non-altruistic children, reduces welfare gains from having an altruistic child, as under the "It's the family" technology.
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Proposition 4 Consider an economy with a public LTC benefit g > 0 to the elderly parents with non-altruistic children. Whatever we consider the "It's the family" or the "It takes a village" technologies, the optimal socialization efforts for all parents are inferior to what these are at the laissez-faire.
Proof. The proof follows from the monotonicity of vðÁÞ. ■ The extent to which LTC benefits affect parental socialization decisions depends on how large those benefits are with respect to the intrafamily aid provided by altruistic children. The impact of governmental aid depends also on the productivity of the government in the production of LTC services. The higher the productivity of the government is (i.e. the higher μ is) the lower the socialization efforts are ceteris paribus, yielding a larger differential in terms of socialization efforts in comparison to the laissez-faire.
The impact of governmental aid depends also on the shape of the elderly's temporal utility function vðÁÞ. When vðÁÞ is close to be flat on the 0; θy ½ interval, the introduction of a governmental aid μg 2 0; θy has little effect on the welfare gain from having altruistic children, and, thus, on socialization decisions. However, if vðÁÞ is quite steeply on the 0; θy ½ interval, the governmental aid reduces the welfare gain from altruistic children significantly in comparison to the laissez-faire, which, in turn, affects the socialization process strongly.
Long-run population dynamics
As shown above, the introduction of LTC public benefits to the dependent elderly in need reduces the parental incentive to socialize children. Given that this tendency affects all parents (altruistic or not), it is tempting to believe that the introduction of the governmental aid is neutral regarding long-run population dynamics. However, as we shall now see, that belief is misleading: the governmental intervention is not neutral for population dynamics.
Proposition 5 Consider the long-run dynamics of q t under the "It's the family" transmission technology. When the government provides a LTC benefit g to the dependent elderly who have non-altruistic children, we have: , tend to make the first case more likely, and the third case less likely. Hence, LTC benefits tend, in the long-run, to make the disappearance of altruism more likely. There is thus a kind of "crowding out" of the family by the State. 27 That crowding out is larger the larger the LTC benefit g is and the more effective the State is in the production of LTC (i.e. the larger μ is). That crowding-out effect relies on socialization: as soon as the State provides a sizeable and efficient help to the dependent elderly in need, young parents have little incentive to socialize their children, since making these altruistic is costly and has little welfare effects. Hence, due to the State intervention, family altruism must disappear. Note, however, that although that crowding out is possible, it is by no way necessary. It remains possible that vðθyÞÀvðμgÞ δ > 1 despite a positive and efficient public aid. In that case, the population will turn out to be fully altruistic in the long-run, despite LTC benefits.
Proposition 6 Consider the long-run dynamics of q t under the "It takes a village" transmission technology. When the government provides a LTC benefit g to the dependent elderly who have non-altruistic children, we have:
27 This "crowding-out" effect differs from the usual one, where public intervention only affects the behaviour of some agent of a particular type. Here, LTC benefits affect the economy by modifying socialization efforts, and hence, the partition of the population into different types. Thus the "crowding-out" effect consists here of more than changing individual behaviours: it changes (some) individuals' type, and, as a corollary, their behaviours as well. Figure 5 under "It's the family" technology and in Figure 6 under "It takes a village" technology. In the former case, family altruism would have, at the laissez-faire, become generalized in the long-run. However, public LTC policy, by pushing the transition function below the 45°line, makes family altruism disappear in the long-run. There is, in that case, a crowding out of family help by State help in the long-run. Note that such a crowding out would not have taken place if the public policy had been of smaller size, in such a way as to maintain the transition function above the 45°line. In Figure 6 , family altruism would have survived at the laissez-faire under a sufficiently large q 0 , but will disappear in the long-run once the government carries out the LTC policy exemplified in that example. Note that, here again, a lower public policy may have preserved the convergence towards q ¼ 1, so that the crowding out is not inevitable. Moreover, even if we keep the policy shown in Figure 6 , the crowding out occurs only under a sufficiently large initial prevalence of altruism. If, on the contrary, the initial proportion of altruistic children is low, family altruism will disappear at the laissez-faire, so that there is no crowding out in that case, where LTC policy is benign.
In sum, the public provision of LTC may crowd out family-provided LTC, by making the disappearance of family altruism more likely. This suggests that the State and the family may be substitutes in the provision of LTC services. However, that section shows also that this crowding-out effect varies with the size and efficiency of the public provision of LTC, as well as with the transmission technology and with individual preferences.
The influence of preferences is particularly important. When the slope of the dependent's utility function vðÁÞ in the neighbourhood of 0 is small, family altruism will, at the laissez-faire, disappear, and thus there cannot be any crowding out in that case. If, on the contrary, the slope of the function vðÁÞ in the neighbourhood of 0 is large, then family altruism will survive in the long-run, whatever the government intervenes or not. Hence, here again, there cannot be any crowding out. Therefore, it is only for an intermediate class of 5 The social optimum and optimal LTC policy LTC benefits can modify the composition of the population, allowing for the disappearance of -(possibly) otherwise surviving -family altruism. Can we deduce from this that there should be no LTC benefits from a long-run perspective? What kind of constraints do evolutionary forces impose on LTC policy? To address those issues, this section will first study the short-run social optimum and its decentralization and, then, examine whether the optimal shortrun policy is compatible or not with long-run social welfare maximization. For that purpose, we will take the classical utilitarian social welfare function as a social objective and look for the allocation of resources that maximizes the sum of utilities of all individuals living at a given point in time, subject to the resources available at that point in time.
Note that the construction of a social welfare function when the population is heterogeneous in altruism can raise serious difficulties, since altruism allows the double-counting of the interests of some agents, while the interests of others are counted only once (see Hammond 1987) . Two possibilities arise regarding the treatment of altruism. On the one hand, the social planner can ignore altruism and only consider the private part of individuals' welfare. On the other hand, the planner can take altruism into account, possibly by weighting individual utility functions differently. Throughout this article, we will choose the former solution, and consider only, in the social welfare function, the private part of agents' welfare, in order to avoid double-counting. 
The short-run social optimum
Let us consider the first-best problem in the short-run, that is, for a given, constant partition q of the population into altruistic and non-altruistic young adults. The social planner's problem consists of selecting consumptions at the young age c a , c n , as well as consumptions at the old age, d a and g, so as
28 Note also that, if we had 0 < β n < β a instead of β n ¼ 0, what would matter for the existence of crowding out would no longer be the slope of vðÁÞ at 0, but, rather, the slope of vðÁÞ at the (strictly positive) level of help given by type-n children.
29 That social objective is formally similar to the one studied in Jousten et al. (2005) .
to maximize social welfare of the population alive at a given period, subject to the resource constraint. That problem can be written by means of the Lagrangian 30 :
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint: at any period, an amount y of resources is available for consumptions by all agents, young and old. After simplifications, the FOCs for consumptions yield:
, we have:
Hence all first-period consumptions should be equal and superior to the consumption at the old age for the dependent elderly. The dependent elderly with non-altruistic children should get fewer resources than the dependent elderly with altruistic children, due to the inefficiency of public LTC services. Regarding the decentralization of the social optimum, note first that, at the laissez-faire, we have:
Comparing those conditions with the ones at the short-run optimum, we see that the decentralization of the short-run optimum requires a lump sum transfer τ Ã ¼ θy ¼ g Ã from non-altruistic children towards their parents to insure that:
Proposition 7 Consider a social planner maximizing the sum of utilities of all individuals living at a given point in time, under a fixed partition q.
-The short-run social optimum involves:
-It can be decentralized by means of LTC benefits g Ã ¼ θy given to the parents of type-n children.
Proof. The proof follows from the comparison of FOCs of the laissez-faire and the short-run social optimum. ■ 30 Given that the partition of the population is assumed to be fixed, we will leave aside the choice of socialization efforts e a and e n , which are set to 0.
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The long-run social optimum
Let us now characterize the long-run social optimum, that is, the best stationary equilibrium, where the partition of the population q is a part of the social planner's choice, unlike in the previous subsection, where q was taken as given.
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For that purpose, we consider the problem of a social planner who chooses consumptions at the young age, c a and c n , consumptions at the old age, d a and g, as well as the (constant) partition of the population q, so as to maximize social welfare at the stationary equilibrium, subject to the resource constraint. That social planning problem can be written by means of the Lagrangian 32 :
The FOCs are:
Given that c aÃÃ ¼ c nÃÃ , the FOC for optimal q can be rewritten as: we know that μg ÃÃ < d aÃÃ . Thus, the RHS of the above FOC must be lower than the LHS, meaning that the marginal welfare gain from raising q always exceeds the marginal welfare loss from raising q. As a consequence, the FOC for an interior optimal q is never satisfied, and the optimal q is a corner solution, equal to q ÃÃ ¼ 1. 33 The intuition is the following. If transferring resources towards the elderly in need involved no loss of resources (i.e. μ ¼ 1), we would have d aÃÃ ¼ g ÃÃ , and the FOC for an interior optimal q would be verified for any q.
However, as long as transferring towards the elderly leads to a loss of resources 31 Note that, by focusing on the best stationary equilibrium, we deliberately abstract from the transition towards the steady-state. 32 Given that the partition of the population is assumed to be fixed, we will leave aside the choice of socialization efforts e a and e n , which are set to 0. 33 As a consequence, the variables c n and g become irrelevant.
(i.e. μ < 1), it is optimal to have a fully altruistic population, in order to avoid the resources losses due to redistribution. Therefore the optimal short-run policy can be compatible or incompatible with long-run social welfare maximization, depending on the structural parameters of the economy. Several cases should be distinguished here. Let us start with the "It's the family" transmission technology.
Lemma 1 Take the "It's the family" technology. Assume 0 < q 0 < 1.
-If vðθyÞÀvðμgÞ δ > 1 for any 0 g θy, then the long-run optimum is always reached.
-If vðθyÞÀvðμgÞ δ < 1 for any 0 g θy, then the long-run optimum is never reached.
-If there exists g < θy such that vðθyÞÀvðμgÞ δ > 1 for any g < g and vðθyÞÀvðμgÞ δ < 1 for any g g, then the decentralization of the long-run optimum requires g < g.
Proof. That lemma follows from combining Propositions 5 and 8. ■
In the first case, public LTC benefits cannot prevent the economy from reaching the long-run social optimum. In the second case, public LTC benefits can take any value as well, since the economy will never reach the long-run optimum. In the third case, there exists a threshold g above which the economy will not exhibit full altruism in the long-run. Hence, in that case, the decentralization of the long-run optimum requires LTC benefits to be strictly lower than g. In the light of Lemma 1, we can discuss the compatibility of optimal shortrun policies with the realization of the long-run social optimum, as well as the possibility of crowding out of family altruism by policy.
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Proposition 9 Consider the economy under the "It's the family" transmission technology. Suppose 0 < q 0 < 1.
-If v θy ð ÞÀvðμgÞ δ < 1 for any 0 g θy, the optimal short-run policy g Ã ¼ θy does not prevent the economy from converging towards the long-run optimum q ÃÃ ¼ 1, since in the long-run q ¼ 0 even when g ¼ 0.
-If v θy ð ÞÀvðμgÞ δ > 1 for any 0 g θy, the optimal short-run policy g Ã ¼ θy does not prevent the economy from converging towards the long-run optimum q ÃÃ ¼ 1, since in the long-run q ¼ 1 even when g ¼ θy.
-Otherwise, the optimal short-run policy g Ã ¼ θy prevents the economy from converging towards the long-run optimum q ÃÃ ¼ 1. To avoid that crowding out, g must satisfy
The tension between short-run and long-run social welfare maximization is not inevitable. Three cases can arise. The first two cases are situations where LTC benefits have no effect on the long-run composition of the population. As a consequence, there can be no incompatibility between the optimal short-run policy and long-run social welfare. The only difference between those two cases is that, in the first case, g Ã ¼ θy is still desirable in the long-run, when altruism will have completely disappeared. In the second case, that policy will only be transitional, as the disappearance of non-altruism in the long-run will make that policy irrelevant. In the third case, the optimal short-run LTC benefit is not compatible with long-run social welfare maximization. This makes family altruism disappear in the long-run. Hence, to avoid that crowding out, LTC benefits must be fixed to a level that is strictly smaller than g. That LTC benefit is thus smaller than the optimal short-run benefit g Ã ¼ θy, but is nonetheless strictly positive when g is strictly positive. 34 Note also that this LTC benefit will only be transitory, since in the long-run, the population will be fully altruistic. Let us now consider the "It takes a village" technology.
Lemma 2 Take the "It takes a village" technology. Assume 0 < q 0 < 1. 34 The influence of intergenerational composition effects on optimal policy in the context of socialization models was also highlighted in Ponthiere (2010) , but in the context of choices affecting one's welfare rather than the welfare of others. stressed that difference, we remain here with three possible cases. In the first two cases, the level of the LTC benefit has no impact at all on the long-run composition of the population. But in the third case, there can be some crowding-out effect, when g is not strictly inferior to the thresholdĝ. Let us now discuss the compatibility of the optimal short-run LTC benefits with long-run social welfare maximization.
Proposition 10 Consider the economy under the "It takes a village" transmission technology. Suppose 0 < q 0 < 1.
-If v θy
ð ÞÀvðμgÞ δ 1, for any 0 g θy, the optimal short-run policy g Ã ¼ θy does not prevent the economy from converging towards the long-run optimum q ÃÃ ¼ 1, since in the long-run q ¼ 0 even when g ¼ 0.
-If v θy ð ÞÀvðμgÞ δ > 1 and if q t > ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi δ v θy ð ÞÀvðμgÞ 2 q for any 0 g θy, the optimal shortrun policy g Ã ¼ θy does not prevent the economy from converging towards the long-run optimum q ÃÃ ¼ 1, since in the long-run q ¼ 1 even when g ¼ θy.
-Otherwise, the optimal short-run policy g Ã ¼ θy prevents the economy from converging towards the long-run optimum q ÃÃ ¼ 1. Proof. See the Appendix. ■
In the first two cases, the long-run dynamics of the population will not vary with public intervention, and there is no discrepancy between the optimal short-run policy and what maximizes long-run social welfare. The same is not true for the third case, where the size of LTC benefits affects the dynamics of the population. In comparison to the "It's the family" technology, the LTC benefit must now satisfy here not one, but two conditions: > 1, for any 0 g θy. The maximum LTC benefit g compatible with a convergence towards q ¼ 1 is lower under the "It takes a village" technology than under the "It's the family" technology. The lower q t is, the larger is the gap between the two maximum LTC benefits.
Proof. The two conditions from Proposition 10 can be rewritten as:
v θy ð Þ À δ > vðμgÞ and v θy ð Þ À δ qt ð Þ 2 > vðμgÞ. Given that 0 < q t < 1, the second term in the LHS of the first condition is smaller, ceteris paribus, than in the second condition. Hence, the LHS of the first condition is larger than in the second condition. Thus g has a lower maximum value under the second condition. ■ The intuition is that, under the "It takes a village" technology, the convergence towards a fully altruistic population is conditional on initial conditions, unlike under "It's the family". Hence, the LTC benefit given to the dependent in need is more constrained under "It takes a village", so as to prevent the non-convergence towards the equilibrium with q ¼ 1.
To sum up, there exists a tension between the optimal short-run LTC policy, which reduces inequalities among the dependent, and the long-run social optimum. The former may, by affecting parental socialization decisions, prevent the convergence towards the latter. Thus, if one wants to allow the -desirableconvergence towards the long-run social optimum, the LTC benefit should be, under general conditions, lower than its optimum short-run level. Evolutionary forces can thus act as a constraint for policy-makers.
Extensions
Savings
We have so far assumed that agents could not save resources for their old days. That assumption is common in the LTC literature (see Jousten et al. 2005) , but is strong. Indeed, private savings constitutes, in the context of old-age dependency risks, a kind of "self-insurance" against LTC costs. This section explores the robustness of our results to introducing savings. To do so, let us assume that type-i's consumption at the old age is now:
where d j t is the aid from his child (of type j), while b i t is his own savings. 35 When γ ¼ 1, there is, for the elderly, a one-to-one substitutability between the two kinds of resources. When γ < 1, the elderly prefers relying on his child's aid, while γ > 1 consists of a preference for financial autonomy. The possibility to save resources for the old age can give rise to various strategic interactions within the family. When choosing his savings, a young adult may anticipate that the aid he will receive from his child at the old age may vary with the amount he saved. When choosing the aid to the elderly, agents may also anticipate that their parents will adjust their savings accordingly. 36 For simplicity, we will here assume that agents, when choosing their own savings, take the aid they will receive from their children (altruistic or not) as given. Similarly, when choosing the aid they provide to their own parent, agents take the amount saved by their parent as given.
The problem faced by an agent of type i 2 a; n f g is now:
y where b k t is the savings of his parent, of type k 2 a; n f g. Under the "It's the family" case, the FOCs yield, for type a:
35 We assume here, for simplicity, that the interest factor R equals 1. 36 Those strategic interactions are studied in Cremer, Gahvari, and Pestieau (2012) .
The first condition characterizes the trade-off between consuming at the young age and giving to the parent. The larger parental savings b i t is, the larger the gap between c a t and d a t is. Thus, the child adjusts the aid he provides to the amount saved by his parent. The second FOC characterizes the optimal savings. It equalizes the marginal welfare loss from savings (LHS) with the marginal welfare gain from savings (RHS), which depends on transition probabilities, and, hence, on the socialization effort e a t , and on the level of q t . The third FOC characterizes the optimal socialization effort. When vðÁÞ is strictly concave, the optimal socialization effort is now, ceteris paribus, smaller than before: the possibility to save reduces the incentive to invest in the socialization of the child.
Regarding type-n agents, we have:
Here again, e n t is, when vðÁÞ is strictly concave, smaller than without savings. To explore the implications of introducing savings, let us now assume that preferences are quasi-linear. 37 The problem of an agent of type i becomes:
where k 2 i; j f g. Denoting by λ i is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint for type i, the FOCs for agents of type a are now:
37 Note that this assumption departs from the assumption v 00 ðÁÞ < 0 made in Section 2, since v 00 ðÁÞ ¼ 0 under quasi-linear preferences.
Several cases can arise. If γ < 1, the FOC for b a tþ1 (expression (30)) is not satisfied, as γ < λ a . Hence there is no savings, since agents always prefer receiving resources from their children. If, on the contrary, γ > 1, the FOC for d a t (expression (29)) is not satisfied, as λ a > 1. Hence, there is no aid provided to the elderly: d a t ¼ 0. The reason is that altruistic agents, in that case, know that parents themselves prefer to be financially autonomous. Therefore, in that case, altruistic agents choose not to help their parents. It is only in the special case of one-toone substitutability between savings and children's aid, i.e. γ ¼ 1, that all FOCs are satisfied. The agent is then indifferent between helping his parent and saving resources. For type-n agents, the FOCs are:
As in the baseline case, we have d n t ¼ 0. Savings are such that the marginal utility gain from savings, γ, equals the marginal utility loss from it, i.e. u 0 ðc n t Þ. Quasi-linear preferences make first-period consumptions -as well as altruistic agents' help -independent from the savings of the old. These make also socialization efforts independent from the level of savings. Those simplifications allow us to highlight the impact of the (more or less strong) substitutability between savings and family aid on agent's choices.
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Proposition 11 Consider the laissez-faire economy under "It's the family", with savings and quasi-linear utility. -Under γ < 1, we have:
38 For each agent, the optimal consumptions, aid and savings are independent from time. This is why we get rid of time indexes. We also ignore the case where γ ¼ 1, since there is then, for type a, perfect indifference between aid and savings, making d a indeterminate.
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The proof follows from the above FOCs. ■
The introduction of savings has a quite different effect on the two types of agents. Non-altruistic agents will, for sure, ignore their parents and save for their old days. But altruistic agents may or may not help their parents, and may or may not save for themselves, depending on the kind of substitutability between family help and parental savings. The long-run dynamics of the economy is summarized below.
Proposition 12 Consider the dynamics of q t under "It's the family", when agents have quasi-linear preferences and can save resources.
• When γ < 1:
-If • When γ > 1: there exist only two stationary equilibria, q ¼ 0 and q ¼ 1. Only q ¼ 0 is locally stable.
Proof. See the Appendix. ■ Introducing savings has a mitigated effect on the survival of family altruism in the long-run, depending on γ. When savings is not a good substitute to family help, i.e. γ < 1, the survival of family altruism in the long-run occurs only if the aid provided by altruistic children is sufficiently large in comparison to socialization costs, i.e. Let us now study the effect of policy on the long-run population dynamics. For that purpose, let us assume, as above, that the government taxes nonaltruistic children through a lump sum tax τ, and use the fiscal revenues to help the elderly in need, who receive μg < g ¼ τ. Under such a policy, we have:
Here again, the socialization efforts are reduced by the introduction of the LTC benefit. Those lower socialization efforts for the two types of agents reduce the likelihood of family altruism survival in the long-run.
Proposition 13 Consider the dynamics of q t under "It's the family", when agents have quasi-linear preferences and can save resources, while the State provides LTC benefits g to the parents of type-n children.
Proof. See the Appendix. ■ Thus, the introduction of savings does not change the impact of LTC benefits on the long-run prevalence of family altruism. The only difference is that, when γ > 1, i.e. when parents prefer to rely on their own savings rather than on their children's help, the introduction of savings makes family altruism disappear at the laissez-faire, implying that LTC benefits are benign. There cannot be, under γ > 1, a crowding out of family aid by policy, since savings have made family aid useless even for altruistic persons, implying that the distinction between altruistic and non-altruistic children becomes irrelevant. Because of space constraints, we do not discuss here the optimal policy with savings. Such a discussion would require turning back to the case of more general preferences. 39 Although we do not carry out such an exercise here, it is clear that, as long as the elderly does not regard savings as a one-to-one substitute to children's help (or even as better than this), the impact of policy on the long-run composition of the population remains a relevant issue. 40 Hence, our main results are -at least qualitatively -robust to introducing private savings.
Universal LTC benefits
So far we have studied the possibility of crowding out of family altruism by the State under a specific policy: LTC benefits towards elderly parents of type-n children. Such targeted LTC benefits may be difficult to implement in the real world, where governments may face difficulties when trying to identify the type of adults or when trying to measure the resources of the elderly. This explains why, in the real world, public LTC benefits depend on the degree of dependency of persons and not on the degree of altruism of their children.
To study the robustness of our results to the set of available policy instruments, let us assume that the government has now two universal instruments: a lump sum tax T on all young adults (altruistic or not) and a LTC benefit G to all elderly agents (with non-altruistic children or not).
Under universal LTC benefits, the problem of an agent of type a is now: 
Those FOCs differ from the one under the targeted instruments, which were: 41 Note that the argument made here also holds in the "It takes a village" case. 
while, under targeted benefits, we had:ĉ Proof. See the Appendix. ■ 42 Indeed, whereas targeted LTC benefits reduced the welfare gap between having altruistic children or not, universal LTC benefits still reduces the gap (given the concavity of vðÁÞ), but less than the targeted ones, which pushes towards more socialization. Proof. See the Appendix. ■ Whatever we consider targeted or universal LTC benefits, the existence of crowding out of family altruism by policy is not guaranteed, since it may still be the case that family altruism would survive whatever the policy is or would disappear even at the laissez-faire. Let us now study the optimal universal LTC benefits. Here again, we will, as above, distinguish between the optimal short-run policy (i.e. for a fixed q t ¼ q) and the optimal long-run policy (i.e. for a varying q t ).
Still assuming vðÁÞ ¼ uðÁÞ, the short-run social planning problem is:
The FOCs yield:
At an interior optimum, we have:
Note also that, from the point of view of the maximization of social welfare in the short-run in a second-best 43 Here again, we abstract from time indexes.
world, universal LTC benefits G are legitimate to an extent that is decreasing in the proportion of altruistic young adults q. However, those LTC benefits, by reducing the socialization efforts of all agents, make the long-run survival of family altruism less likely, ceteris paribus. Therefore, there exists, here again, a tension between maximizing short-run social welfare and maximizing long-run social welfare. Given that long-run social welfare is maximized when q ¼ 1, evolutionary forces impose a restriction on the size of LTC benefits: these need to be compatible with the survival of family altruism in the long-run.
Proposition 16 Consider the economy under "It's the family", with vðÁÞ ¼ uðÁÞ. Suppose 0 < q 0 < 1. -Otherwise, the optimal short-run policy G Ã prevents the economy from converging towards the long-run optimum q ÃÃ ¼ 1. Therefore, in order to avoid such a crowding-out effect, the LTC benefit must satisfy the condition ud a þμG ð ÞÀuðμGÞ
Proof. See the Appendix. ■ Evolutionary forces impose, in general, an upper bound on the level of universal LTC benefits, so as to allow for the survival of family altruism in the long-run. Given that universal LTC benefits tend to reduce socialization efforts to a larger extent than targeted benefits, the condition > 1, which implies that the restriction imposed by evolutionary forces on universal LTC benefits exceeds the one imposed on targeted benefits. In sum, our previous results are qualitatively robust to assuming that only universal LTC benefits are available policy instruments. Evolutionary forces impose an upper bound restriction on LTC benefits to the elderly dependent, whatever those benefits are targeted or not. The main difference is that those restrictions are, ceteris paribus, larger on universal LTC benefits, since those Long-Term Care, Altruism and Socialization benefits lead to a larger contraction of socialization efforts and, as such, impose a more serious threat on the survival of family altruism in the long-run.
Concluding remarks
It is difficult to define the optimal public intervention in the provision of LTC. On the one hand, the large heterogeneity among families justifies some intervention aimed at helping elderly persons in need. On the other hand, public policy may crowd out intrafamily aid and, hence, reduce social welfare.
The goal of this article was to examine the optimal design of LTC policy when the public aid to the elderly dependent can crowd out intrafamily aid. We focused on a particular kind of crowding-out effect: the government, by intervening, may affect the transmission of values within and across families and may make family altruism disappear.
We developed a three-period OLG model where the population is partitioned in two groups: altruistic persons, who care about their parents, and non-altruistic persons, who do not. That partition is the outcome of a socialization process à la Bisin and Verdier (2001) , where parental direct vertical socialization and oblique socialization interact.
We showed that a public provision of LTC, by reducing the expected (net) welfare gains from having an altruistic child, lowers parental socialization efforts. That reduction, which is observed at the temporary equilibrium, does not necessarily imply the disappearance of family altruism, which depends on the intertemporal equilibrium. Whether such a crowding out exists or not depends on (1) individual preferences (in particular the old-age temporal utility function); (2) the characteristics of the socialization process (cost and transmission); (3) initial conditions (under the "It takes a village" technology).
We identified conditions under which there exists a conflict between the optimal short-run LTC policy (i.e. under a fixed partition of the population) and the long-run social optimum. That conflict is not inevitable, but LTC benefits, if fixed to their optimal short-run level, can prevent the economy from reaching the long-run social optimum. Hence, evolutionary forces impose, in general, an upper limit on LTC benefits. We also studied the robustness of our results to introducing savings and universal LTC benefits. The crowding out of altruism still depends on preferences and on the socialization process, and there remains, in general, a conflict between short-run and long-run social welfare.
In sum, although the public provision of LTC can affect the transmission of values and may even make altruism disappear, such a crowding out is by no way automatic. The existence and size of such a crowding-out effect depends on individual preferences, and on the particular socialization process that governs the transmission of values. The latter point, although generally unnoticed, is worth being underlined. The optimal public intervention depends significantly on the "response" induced by the socialization process at work.
Finally, let us mention some limitations of this study. A first limitation consists of the replacement fertility assumption. In a model with endogenous fertility, the chosen fertility would depend on how children behave with respect to their old parents: either competition among children to be the main caregiver (which would lead parents to make more children) or free-riding of children (which would lead each parent to make only one child). Moreover, the production of health at the old age may include inputs that are highly complementary. This may affect the conditions under which crowding out can occur. Furthermore, socialization processes in the real world do not only concern the transmission of altruism (i.e. the parameter β i ) but also other aspects of preferences (e.g. functions uðÁÞ and vðÁÞ) or other technical aspects (e.g. agents' productivity). Multidimensional socialization models could thus possibly lead to different results about the possible crowding out of family aid by the State. All those implications remain to be explored in the future.
have F 0 ðq t Þ > 0 and F 00 ðq t Þ > 0 for all levels of q t , so that Fðq t Þ is increasing and convex, and admits no inflection point, and remains below the 45°line for 0 < q t < 
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider now the "It takes a village" technology. We have: q tþ1 ; Gðq t Þ ¼ q As a consequence, there must exist at least one intersection of GðÁÞ with the 45°l ine for a level of q t that is larger than 0 and smaller than 1: an intermediate steady-state must then exist. Note also that the second-order derivative is G 00 ðq t Þ ¼ 2 þ 6q t 1 À 2q t ð Þ Δ δ . Its sign is ambiguous and may depend on q t . Note that: G 00 ð0Þ ¼ 2 > 1 and G 00 ð1Þ ¼ 2 À 6 Δ δ . Thus, the transition function is convex around q t ¼ 0 and may turn out to be concave at q t ¼ 1, provided 
Proof of Proposition 9
If v θy ð ÞÀvðμgÞ δ < 1 for any 0 g θy, we have, in the long-run, q ¼ 0. That result holds whatever g is. Hence, in that case where public intervention has no effect on the population dynamics, the optimal policy in the long-run consists of the optimal policy in the short-run, that is, a LTC benefit g Ã ¼ θy from non-altruistic children towards their parents. If v θy ð ÞÀvðμgÞ δ > 1 for any 0 g θy, the long-run composition of the population is q ¼ 1. That result holds whatever g is. Hence, in that case, the optimal longrun policy is the laissez-faire. However, in the short-run, it is optimal to implement a LTC benefit g Ã ¼ θy from non-altruistic children towards their parents.
Otherwise, if we exclude those two cases, the level of g will determine the long-run composition of the population. In other words, there exists a threshold g such that vðθyÞÀvðμgÞ δ > 1 for any g < g and vðθyÞÀvðμgÞ δ
< 1 for any g g. The convergence towards the stationary equilibrium with q ¼ 1 requires:
v θy ð ÞÀvðμgÞ δ > 1. Hence, it is necessary that g < g. This implies that the LTC benefit should be lower than the optimal short-run benefit g Ã ¼ θy.
Proof of Proposition 10
Consider first the case where v θy ð ÞÀvðμgÞ δ 1 for any 0 g θy. In that case, the long-run composition of the population is q ¼ 0. That result holds whatever the level of g is. Hence, in that case where the public intervention has no effect on the population dynamics, the optimal policy in the long-run consists of the optimal policy in the short-run, that is, a LTC benefit g Ã ¼ θy from non-altruistic children towards their parents. If v θy ð ÞÀvðμgÞ δ > 1 for any 0 g θy, the long-run composition of the population is q ¼ 1. Here again, that result holds whatever the LTC benefit g is. In that case, the public intervention has no effect on the population dynamics and thus the policy is not constrained by evolutionary forces.
Otherwise, if we exclude those two cases, the level of g will determine the long-run composition of the population. In other words, there exists a threshold
